City guards are primarily engaged in parking enforcement – confirmed by the Supreme Audit Office report and the data.
The ranking is part of an ongoing academic article analysing the total cost of illegal parking in Poland.
The ranking was created based on an analysis of 10,000 pages of documents obtained through hundreds of freedom of information requests submitted to city offices, municipal guard units, the police, the fire brigade, ministries and paid parking zone operators.
The aim of this comparison is to take an objective look at the effectiveness and costs of these formations, away from common opinions.
Authors:
The ranking covers 18 Polish provincial cities (voivodeship capitals). We assess not only the effectiveness of the city guard itself, but also the local authority's approach to parking policy: the budget allocated to the guard, the proportion of penalties imposed, and the fiscal aggressiveness of paid parking zones.
The maximum score is 1200 points. None of the guards studied is truly effective at enforcing parking regulations – therefore the ranking starts from place 2. First place remains vacant.
Analysis of score components for individual city guards. Progress bars show the score in each category (bar length = points scored / max points). below average above average
None of the 18 analysed city guards takes first place – because none enforces parking regulations truly effectively. Importantly, this is not a problem specific to these 18 units: Poland has 407 municipal and communal guard formations and not one of them currently has the tools needed to genuinely discipline drivers who park in violation of the law.
This does not mean that flawed regulations justify inaction. The ranking shows clearly that in individual areas it is possible to act more or less effectively – and it is precisely those differences that we measure.
Just how uncompromising we can be towards drivers is perfectly illustrated by paid parking zones. We know how to discipline drivers. It is a shame it only works for those who park legally.
For city guards to become effective, changes in the law are needed. Detailed proposals can be found on the Urban Parking Agenda pages.
Record-holder for efficiency – monthly parking fines per guard are the highest in Poland; actively uses wheel clamps and towing. Weaknesses: very heavy focus on parking alone – the guard barely enforces any other violations. Also a 'greedy' local authority – SPP fees exceed three times the value of guard fines for parking.
One of the best-funded municipal guards, with high staffing and a large per-capita budget translating into good (though not the best) results in most areas. Unfortunately, SM Kraków tows infrequently and issues many warnings. The ratio of SPP penalties to guard fines is disappointing.
One of the strictest and most fine-effective units in Poland; high responsiveness to residents' reports places it at the national forefront in that regard. Weaknesses: towing remains low despite strong results in other categories; guard salaries are among the lowest in the study. The local authority exceeds the three-times fiscal threshold – SPP collects noticeably more than the value of guard fines.
Undisputed leader in staffing, budget and absolute towing activity – in each of these categories Warsaw's result is the highest in Poland by a wide margin. Weaknesses: scale does not compensate for low per-guard efficiency; almost all fines concern parking, wheel clamps are virtually non-existent, and response to residents' reports is symbolic. SPP imposes over four times the value of its own guard's fines.
Leader in fiscal fairness – the only city where SPP collects less from drivers than the guard recovered in fines; active in towing from pedestrian crossings and wrecks. Weaknesses: one of the smallest and worst-funded units in the study; wheel clamps are not used, and the ratio of fines to warnings is among the worst.
Among the leaders in efficiency and severity – guards issue many fines per person, rarely settling for a warning; high clamping activity places SM Lublin just behind the leader. Towing is at a high level, but with a striking disproportion: almost exclusively for illegal parking, ignoring wrecks and pedestrian crossings. Missing SPP data results in automatic zero points for Unfairness.
Leader in wheel-clamp use and the only city where guard fine enforcement exceeds additional fees collected by SPP – two top positions simultaneously; active in towing from pedestrian crossings and wrecks. Weaknesses: small and poorly-funded unit with salaries at the lowest level; the guard issues many warnings at the expense of fines, resulting in zero points in Leniency.
Effective and fine-severe at moderate funding; one of the more favourable ratios of SPP fees to guard fines in the study. Weaknesses: focus almost exclusively on fining – no towing or clamping at any measurable scale; minimal response to residents' reports; parking fines exceed the Traffic Fines metric threshold.
One of the leaders in wreck towing and active in towing overall; a fair ratio of SPP fees to guard fines earns solid points for Unfairness. Weaknesses: record holder for one-sidedness – the highest share of parking fines in total fines in Poland, resulting in zero points in Traffic Fines Share; guard salaries and budget at the bottom of the field.
A rare combination: active in clamping and responsive to residents' reports simultaneously – in both categories close to the national top; one of the few cases where the share of parking fines does not exceed the Traffic Fines threshold. Weaknesses: towing is sporadic across all categories; SPP exceeds the three-times fiscal threshold, resulting in zero points for Unfairness.
Runner-up in salaries in Poland; high absolute towing activity and presence in pedestrian-crossing towing. Weaknesses: almost all fines concern parking, exceeding the Traffic Fines threshold; SPP above the three-times fiscal threshold; wheel clamps are virtually unused; the guard barely responds to residents' reports.
Leader in two categories at once: pedestrian-crossing towing and responsiveness to residents' reports – both at maximum. Weaknesses: SPP imposes by far the highest fees relative to guard fines of all cities studied – the extreme worst fiscal result in Poland; the guard is also exceptionally lenient in its ratio of fines to warnings.
A fair local authority – one of the more favourable ratios of SPP fees to guard fines in Poland; parking fines below the Traffic Fines threshold; active in wheel clamping. Guard salaries at the lowest level in the study.
ERRATA: On 16 March 2026 SM Bydgoszcz supplemented the results with 1,135 vehicle tows, which would change its position in the ranking to 11th place with 449 points.
Decent wreck-towing activity and SPP formally below the three-times fiscal threshold – among the few positives. Weaknesses: low fine efficiency and high cost per fine; no pedestrian-crossing towing; poor cooperation with residents.
One of the higher guard-to-population ratios in Poland with a favourable SPP ratio – that is where the positives end. Weaknesses: large staffing does not translate into fine efficiency or towing activity; the guard practically does not respond to residents' reports – last place in Poland in this category. Almost all fines concern parking.
Parking fines formally below the Traffic Fines threshold – one of the few positives at moderate staffing. Weaknesses: the guard is exceptionally lenient, barely uses wheel clamps, responds sporadically to residents' reports, and towing activity is among the lowest in Poland.
One of the smallest and worst-funded units in the study, which determines results across all operational categories. Zero clamping and towing activity in all metrics; parking fines marginally exceed the Traffic Fines threshold. A moderate ratio of SPP fees to guard fines – one of the few positives.
Apparent strength: the lowest share of parking fines in Poland results in maximum points in Traffic Fines Share – but this is an effect of near-zero overall fining activity, not enforcement diversity. The guard operates symbolically: the lowest staffing and budget in Poland by a wide margin, no clamps, no towing, and no SPP data.
At the end of 2024, Poland had a total of 407 municipal and communal guard units (referred to as SM throughout the ranking), with a combined provision of over 8,661 posts.
At the national level, there are enormous disparities in guard size. In stark contrast stand the largest units – such as SM Warsaw, which alone had 1,908 posts (employing 1,616 people), and SM Kraków with 585 posts (employing 580 people). On the other hand, many of the 407 units are one- or two-person formations. Single-officer municipal guards operate, for example, in Nowe Miasto (Mazovian Voivodeship), Krajenka (Greater Poland Voivodeship) or Lewin Brzeski (Opole Voivodeship).
For the purposes of this ranking, however, we focus exclusively on voivodeship capitals and the rate of guards per 100,000 residents. Here, a clear leader emerges. Only in Warsaw are there more than 60 guards per 100,000 residents. At the other end of the scale is the Lubusz Voivodeship. In Gorzów Wielkopolski and Zielona Góra this rate is below 15.
A comparison of these units' budgets is also interesting – particularly in relation to city size, i.e. the annual budget per resident. The leader here is Warsaw with a city guard budget of 140 PLN per resident. In second place is Kraków with 133 PLN.
The anti-leader of this comparison is again the Lubusz Voivodeship. In Gorzów it is 19 PLN, and in Zielona Góra... 3 PLN. The extremely low figure in Zielona Góra stems not only from the small size of the formation. It is the only guard in the voivodeship capitals that is not a separate budgetary unit, but merely a department within the city office. This means that the actual budget of the unit is probably closer to that of Gorzów.
An analysis of fine structure confirms the data presented in the NIK report on municipal guard funding from 2016:
The structure of interventions carried out by the guards resulted, among other things, from residents' reports and did not change significantly during the period covered by the audit. The largest share of detected offences (62 per cent) were offences against road safety and order.
What did this picture look like in 2024? As many as 76% of fines issued by guards concerned road traffic regulations. Taking into account the heavily restricted powers of municipal guards and the detailed analysis of the Toruń SM report, which had an appropriate level of detail, it is reasonable to conclude that as many as 98% of fines related to road traffic violations concerned parking specifically.
The above observation confirms the common perception – municipal guards are treated as formations "for illegal parking".
City guards are primarily engaged in parking enforcement – confirmed by the Supreme Audit Office report and the data.
The fine is the city guard's key tool for maintaining public order and safety in local communities. Of course, it is difficult to judge the effectiveness of a guard solely by how quickly it issues fines. But an analysis of the collected data reveals a surprising picture.
Every eight hours, a guard officer in the most effective city guard in Poland issues a fine. In many cities – Warsaw, Wrocław and Łódź included – officers issue an average of 5–6 fines per month.
Taking into account the average fine amount for road traffic offences, approximately 149 PLN, a picture of the inefficiency of these formations emerges.
Fewer than one fine per day is issued by guards in the most productive city guard in Poland! The average is half that – just one fine every two days.
Deserving separate discussion is the particular case of the average fine amount in Szczecin, which is twice the national average. How is this possible?
An analysis of the fine schedule, conversations with the formation's leadership, and field observation provide the answer.
The Municipal Guard in Szczecin receives pressure from the City Office to self-finance to the greatest possible extent. Unlike Poznań or Lublin, however, it achieves this not through efficiency, but by concentrating primarily on the most "lucrative" offences.
According to the fine schedule, these are parking within an intersection and parking in a disabled spot. The unfortunate effect is that officers are "blind" to offences that pose safety risks (e.g. parking in front of a pedestrian crossing), but will stop of their own accord at every blue envelope.
A common argument in debates about the usefulness of city guards is their cost to the city budget. The following chart shows what percentage of a unit's annual budget is "returned" to the city's coffers in the form of fine revenues. This figure illustrates the extent to which the city guard "pays for itself", though it must be remembered that the formation's overriding purpose is to maintain order, not to generate profit.
This is the average share of the annual city guard budget covered by fine revenues in voivodeship capital cities.
In the following comparison, we examine the relationship between the city guard budget and the number of fines and warnings issued. In a broad simplification, this is an attempt to calculate the cost of issuing a single fine or warning. All fines are taken into account in this comparison – including those unrelated to parking or road traffic.
The conclusions are surprising. The cost of issuing a single fine, calculated in this way, exceeds one thousand PLN. The City of Warsaw pays its city guard 1,707 PLN for every fine or warning issued.
We are aware of the nature of this data. City guards were not established to issue fines. However, set against the fact that 76% of their activity concerns illegal parking, and that fines and warnings are virtually their only form of enforcement, the numbers are striking.
Dividing the budgets of Polish city guards by the number of fines issued gives us over 1,700 PLN per fine.
Analysing the number of fines alone is not enough. It is crucial to understand who issues them and under what conditions officers work. The number of posts "on paper" often diverges from reality. Vacancies, civilian employees and salary levels are factors that directly affect the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of city guards.
Work in the city guard is not among the best-paid, although clear differences between cities are visible. The leader is Kraków with a median of almost 10,000 PLN gross. It should be noted, however, that these figures may include seniority supplements or bonuses, and the "bare" salary may be lower.
At the other end of the scale are cities such as Olsztyn and Szczecin, where the median earnings hover around 5,000 PLN gross. Given the nature of the service – working in difficult conditions, stress and risk – these rates are not competitive in today's labour market.
Note: in two cities (Bydgoszcz and Rzeszów) we were unable to obtain median salary data. Both formations stated they do not hold this data. For Rzeszów we have data for 2023 (only 4,372 PLN).
Guards in Kraków earn twice as much as guards in Olsztyn.
Low pay combined with demanding work and a lack of social prestige (or even outright hostility) means city guards face enormous recruitment difficulties. In Warsaw, Wrocław and Gdańsk, almost one in five guard posts is vacant. The record holder is Opole, where nearly 30% of posts are unfilled.
A high vacancy rate means that existing patrols are overloaded and response time to residents' reports lengthens. It is a vicious cycle – fewer guards means lower effectiveness, which leads to greater resident frustration and a further decline in the formation's prestige.
Record holder for unfilled posts. In Warsaw, Wrocław and Gdańsk approximately 17–18% of guard positions are vacant.
Not every post in a city guard means a uniform on the street. Part of the staff are civilian employees – city monitoring operators, administrators, accountants and HR staff. On average, civilian employees make up about 20% of all staff in voivodeship capitals.
It is worth noting the proportions. In Opole and Białystok the share of civilians is higher, reaching or even exceeding 30%. This may suggest more developed administrative structures or outsourcing of certain tasks (e.g. monitoring) to civilians, which is not necessarily a bad thing as long as it frees uniformed officers for field work.
One in three employees of this unit is not a guard. The average for voivodeship capital cities is around 20%.
An analysis of the ratio of warnings to fines reveals significant differences in city guards' approaches to law enforcement. Given the very low fines for stopping violations (most commonly 100 PLN, an amount unchanged for 22 years), even a fine has become a form of warning. Particularly so since, in the case of public transport violations or failure to pay for parking in a zone, higher penalty amounts apply (up to 550 PLN) and there is no option to issue a warning.
For this reason, city guards that issue more warnings than fines are treated in this ranking as less effective. If we show no leniency towards public transport passengers and honest drivers using the SPP, it is hard to justify the liberal use of warnings.
The ratio of warnings to fines differs dramatically between cities. The anti-leaders of this ranking are SM Zielona Góra and Gorzów Wielkopolski, issuing 5 and 2.5 warnings respectively for every fine. At the other end of the scale are SM Gdańsk and Poznań, which issue 15 and 11 fines for every warning.
Over five warnings are issued for every single fine. The highest ratio in Poland.
In the total number of sanctions relating to road traffic offences (fines + warnings) in voivodeship capital cities.
Applying a wheel clamp is extra work for a guard officer. It has to be brought to the scene, fitted, and a notice filled in. Then the officer must return to remove it. From a "fine productivity" perspective, slipping notices under windshield wipers seems much faster.
However, the clamp has other merits – educational value and the inevitability of punishment. A notice under the windshield can be ignored. There are a number of ways to avoid a fine, including the most popular: the "foreign plates" trick (see the Urban Parking Agenda proposal). The clamp immobilises the vehicle and forces the driver into direct confrontation with the officer.
If we accept that fitting a clamp is extra effort, then officers in Olsztyn, Kielce and Lublin are clear leaders in diligence. A typical officer in Olsztyn fits 6.8 clamps per month. In Kielce it is 6.5, and in Lublin 6.3.
This is a high result, given that the clamp is just one of their tools. A high number of clamps per post shows that commanders in these cities prioritise the quality and inevitability of punishment, not just the "quick statistic" of notices under windshields.
In several cities (Zielona Góra, Gorzów and Rzeszów) clamps are not used at all. Białystok and Wrocław use clamps in homeopathic quantities. Warsaw also performs very poorly – about half a clamp per month per officer.
Per month. Guards in Olsztyn, Kielce and Lublin put the most effort into physically immobilising vehicles.
Having a vehicle towed is the most severe sanction an illegally parked driver can face. It not only involves a heavy fine, but also the costs of the tow truck and impound, and a loss of time. The law permits towing in strictly defined cases, including when a vehicle is parked in a prohibited place and obstructs traffic or poses a safety risk, occupies a disabled space without authorisation, or is standing on a T-24 sign with a "tow zone" plate.
The numbers are relentless. Warsaw accounts for nearly half of all tows in voivodeship capitals. 16,482 towed vehicles is an impressive figure, even accounting for the city's size. By comparison, Wrocław – second in the ranking – towed just over 3,000 vehicles.
The capital accounts for over half of all vehicle tows in voivodeship capital cities in Poland.
The disparity is so large that we also analysed the number of removed vehicles per 100,000 residents. Even after this normalisation, the ranking and conclusions do not change significantly. Warsaw still dominates, towing twice as many vehicles as Wrocław in second place. Additionally, it becomes apparent that being "the victim" of having your vehicle removed from the road in Poland is very unlikely.
In Poland approximately 3 vehicles per 1,000 residents are towed annually. Two of them are in Warsaw.
An analysis of the reasons for towing sheds interesting light on the strategies of individual commands.
"T-24 sign": Over 60% of all vehicle removals concern parking on a prohibition with a "tow truck" sign. Why? This is administratively the simplest procedure – the sign is unambiguous and arguing with the driver is difficult.
"Traffic obstruction": About 16% of cases concern obstructing traffic. This is also a relatively straightforward grounds. One vehicle blocks another.
"Wrecks": Almost 10% of cases concern the removal of so-called wrecks. The procedure for their removal is lengthy and complex.
"Disabled spots": Over 4% of cases concern parking in blue-envelope disabled spots. Here, too, the regulations are clear.
"Creating a hazard": Fewer than half a percent of cases concern creating a hazard. This is a very alarming figure, because it is precisely this category that enables the removal of vehicles from in front of pedestrian crossings, for example. Unfortunately, road traffic law does not define the concept of "creating a hazard", and this is where officers face the greatest risk of court challenge.
"Exceeding permissible total weight": In Poland, heavy vehicles are practically never removed from pavements. The regulation on permissible gross weight on pavements (less than 2.5 tonnes) is a dead letter.
Removal of vehicles under the "creating a hazard" provision is marginal. Yet it is the only way to remove vehicles blocking pedestrian crossings.
A cross-sectional analysis of response times is not straightforward, as there is no standardised way of reporting this data.
In the media, information sometimes appears that waiting for the city guard in Warsaw can take several dozen hours. On the other hand, the fact that the city guard in Szczecin arrives within one or two hours is not necessarily a good sign. It turns out that this guard uses the technique of not answering the phone until a free patrol is available – thereby improving its statistics.
For this reason, we decided to use data collected by the Uprzejmie Donoszę service. Individual reports have a recorded time of creation, time of the offence, and – crucially – the time of submission to the city guard unit. In cases where the city guard informs the reporting person that the matter has been concluded, this can also be recorded in the system.
The above information allows us to measure the time from submission of a report to the conclusion of the matter by fine or warning.
This technique has two limitations. The first is that for some cities the number of reports is insufficient to draw conclusions. The second limitation arises from the fact that some units systematically discourage residents from submitting violation reports and do not provide information about the conclusion of cases. In such a situation, even with a relatively large number of reports, there is very little information about concluded cases, which again makes it impossible to draw reliable conclusions.
For this reason, the chart below does not include all cities. Cities not included are those where city guards either actively discourage reporting – for example by requiring the witness to appear in person for each individual report – or do not inform about the status of case closure.
It is also not known whether the user changes the status immediately upon receiving a letter or other information from the city guard, or for example two weeks later. There is also probably a group of users who ignore these letters and do not change statuses at all.
Nevertheless, for cities where the number of reports is sufficiently large, a comparison is possible.
Cities for which fewer than 1,000 reports were registered in Uprzejmie Donoszę are Olsztyn, Zielona Góra, Kielce, Lublin, Rzeszów and Szczecin. These are cities where city guards require the witness of an offence to appear in person for each individual report. This effectively discourages residents from reporting offences.
In Warsaw, the average time from submitting a report of illegal parking to the driver being fined or warned is 220 days (over 7 months).
Interesting light is shed on cooperation between residents and city guards by the ratio of closed to total reports. This coefficient determines what share of residents' reports was marked as closed (regardless of the outcome – whether it was a fine, warning, or other). This means that the city guard made the effort to inform the resident about the conclusion of proceedings.
Data on police activity is very fragmentary. Some police commands refused to provide data, others supplied only aggregate information about all road offences. Only some units provided detailed statistics specifically on parking-related offences.
Based on the data received, two coefficients were estimated:
This made it possible to estimate the missing data for the remaining cities. Where it was possible to calculate the number of parking fines for a given city using both coefficients, the higher value was used.
Police in voivodeship capital cities issued only 29,000 fines for parking offences. City guards issued 294,000 fines.
The police have considerably broader powers than the city guard. In the context of illegal parking, key is the ability to impose sanctions for driving along a pavement or across a pedestrian crossing. The city guard can only fine for driving on the pavement... on a bicycle. The police have no such restrictions.
We checked the statistics on this phenomenon at the National Police Headquarters (KGP). We received the following figures:
The KGP was unable to provide the number of warnings. We can, however, calculate that only 4.7% of cases ended with a fine or a court referral. This means that in 95.3% of cases officers issued a warning or were unable to conclude the matter in any other way.
In 2025 the police recorded approximately 49,000 offences related to driving along a pavement or across a pedestrian crossing. Only 1,624 fines were issued and 669 cases referred to court.
Analyses carried out between 2012 and 2024 paint a picture of cities grappling with the chronic problem of illegal parking. The phenomenon is strongest in areas with a large deficit of parking spaces, but – interestingly – also occurs where free spaces are available but paid. Drivers frequently make a conscious choice to park on grass verges, near intersections or on pavements in order to avoid paid parking zone (SPP) charges, counting on the low effectiveness of the city guard.
In many cities, the areas with the highest rate of violations are those directly adjacent to paid zones, which become a free "hinterland" for people working in the city centre. The scale of violations ranges from a few to as many as several dozen percent of all vehicles found in a given area.
The data presented in the report is the result of research processes going beyond standard fine statistics. The following techniques were used in the cities analysed:
The table below presents specific numbers of vehicles parked in violation of the law, identified during field research.
Note: Due to different research methodologies and, above all, different study areas, these numbers cannot be compared directly. That is, the scale of illegal parking in Łódź is not 20 times higher than in Poznań. The study area is simply different.
The city-wide estimate is calculated based on the proportion that the studied area bears to the whole city. For example, if 1,000 illegally parked vehicles were found in a studied part of the city inhabited by about 5% of its residents, the estimated figure for the whole city would be 20,000 vehicles (1,000 / 0.05).
Only by combining these measurements with the number of fines issued by the city guard and police does the picture become truly revealing.
The scale of the problem becomes even clearer when we look at the percentage share of "parking pirates" in the total number of vehicles.
In Wrocław's zone A, almost every other car stands in violation of the law. This is not a local peak – it is the average for the entire zone. In Gdańsk the figure locally exceeds 60%.
The authors of the studies explicitly point to the low effectiveness of the services responsible for order:
According to the report authors, illegal parking is not merely an aesthetic problem, but above all:
In the Field Research section we collected data on the number of vehicles parked illegally in selected parts of Polish cities. We also estimated the number of illegally parked vehicles city-wide. In the Fines section we analysed how many fines individual city guards issue per year. We also include data on fines issued by the police for parking offences.
A natural question therefore arises: what is the probability that we will receive a fine for illegal parking? – and not only from the city guard, but from anyone at all.
Field research covers small parts of cities – one street, one district, one zone. The number of fines comes from city-wide data. Comparing these figures directly would be a methodological error.
We can, however, define two probability boundaries:
Both values are given jointly for city guard and police.
The table shows two types of estimates. For cities where field research covered a larger share of residents (Szczecin, Kielce, Łódź, Gorzów), we give a min ~ max range: the lower value accounts for the scale of the studied area, the upper value optimistically assumes that the studied fragment exhausts the entire problem. For cities with a small study area (Rzeszów, Poznań, Warsaw) we show only the lower estimate (~ min), as the upper bound would be so inflated as to be analytically meaningless.
Even the upper bound does not exceed 4% for any city (Szczecin: 3.7%). For most cities, the maximum falls in the 1–2% range. It is worth noting that Poznań and Warsaw – despite issuing 123 and 237 fines per day respectively – perform similarly to smaller cities once the enormous scale of illegal parking estimated for the whole city is taken into account.
Gorzów stands out with the lowest level of enforcement: just 5 fines per day translates into a range of 0.07–0.9%, the lowest result in the comparison.
The probability of receiving a fine for illegal parking in Poland – from the city guard or police – is a fraction of a percent.
The Paid Parking Zone (SPP) is a fee-collection system for parking managed by operators selected through tender or by municipal units. In addition to city guard fines, SPP operators can impose additional fees on drivers who park without a valid ticket or who exceed the permitted parking time.
In this section we analyse two key financial metrics of the zones, based on data obtained from operators through freedom of information requests:
Note: Financial SPP data could not be obtained for two cities: Zielona Góra (did not respond to the freedom of information request) and Lublin (referred to the budget resolution from which the separate values for individual SPP metrics cannot be read).
Warsaw, Kraków and Poznań generate by far the most parking fee revenue per resident. The clear gap between these cities and the rest of the field results from both the greater scale of the zones and higher hourly rates. A second reason is that these are cities with a large number of tourists and visitors from outside the agglomeration. It is they who pay hourly parking rates, generating up to 80% of SPP operators' revenue.
The lowest values are in Gorzów Wielkopolski, Kielce and Bydgoszcz. The orange portion of each bar represents fees for violating parking rules; the purple portion – parking fees. Both metrics are independent of each other.
The following chart compares in absolute values the two streams of money collected from drivers for parking violations: the total value of illegal-parking fines issued by the city guard and the total amount of additional fees collected by the SPP operator.
A city guard fine is a criminal-law instrument – imposed by an officer for a road traffic offence. An SPP additional fee is a civil-law instrument – issued by a zone controller for failure to pay or for exceeding the permitted parking time. Both mechanisms are meant to encourage drivers to comply with the rules, yet belong to entirely different legal orders.
City guard fine:
SPP additional fee:
The table below compares both these charges and in the final column presents the coefficient: penalties for correctly-parked drivers (SPP) / penalties for illegally-parked drivers.
The total SPP additional fees (e.g. late payment) exceed 134 million PLN. The total of fines is barely 42 million PLN!
Let us look more closely at this coefficient on a separate chart. Here we can see each local authority's approach to penalising drivers.
In Opole, drivers who park correctly but commit a minor violation – for example, they are late paying or mix up the zone type – pay almost 9 times higher penalties than drivers who ignore parking regulations altogether.
Only in one voivodeship capital do guard fines exceed additional fees in the zone (in Olsztyn).
In Opole, drivers parking in violation of the rules are treated almost 9 times more leniently than those who, for example, were late paying in the SPP.
How does illegal parking impede the work of the Fire Brigade?
Publication will be announced on x.com/SzymonNieradka
The report was created on the basis of a detailed analysis of public data on the operation of city guards in Poland's largest cities. Below we present the methodology for data collection and analysis.
Synthetic indicators are built to describe multidimensional phenomena with a single index – for example social development, quality of life, regional competitiveness or safety levels. The starting point is always a conceptual framework: defining which dimensions (e.g. economic, social, environmental) are relevant and which measurable detailed indicators best represent them.
Since detailed indicators are usually measured in different units, normalisation procedures are applied, e.g. transformation to a 0–1 scale, z-score standardisation, scaling relative to the best result (ratio-to-best) or rescaling to a 0–100 range, as in many contemporary social indices. At this stage it is also decided whether a higher value of a given indicator is "better" or "worse" and accordingly those with an unfavourable direction (e.g. mortality, unemployment) are reversed. Weights are then assigned – equal or based on expert or statistical analysis (e.g. PCA). The normalised and weighted indicators are then combined into a synthetic index, most commonly using arithmetic or geometric mean, less often more complex formulas that limit the possibility of a very weak result in one dimension being compensated by a very strong result in another.
Good practice includes conducting sensitivity analyses, i.e. checking how a change in the normalisation method, weights or aggregation method affects the final values of the index and the ranking of units. Parallel analysis of the individual indicators is also recommended, so that the synthetic indicator does not replace information about which specific areas a given unit performs well or poorly in.
In the existing academic literature, studies directly devoted to the effectiveness of city guard / local police activities in the area of parking offences are surprisingly few. This gap is partly filled by European project reports and institutional audits, e.g. Park4SUMP materials on the role of enforcement in parking policy, or reports by national auditors analysing fee collection and control organisation. Additionally, an important part of contemporary knowledge is provided by industry sources – blog posts and white papers from technology companies and parking system operators – where proposed KPI indicators and patrol management strategies actually used in cities are described in detail. These constitute a valuable source of knowledge about practical solutions and metrics.
The first group of indicators concerns the productivity of officers and patrols. It includes the number of parking fines, clamps and tows per guard over a given period, as well as intensity indicators such as the number of fines in relation to hours of duty, number of vehicles checked, and average time between fines. These indicators are primarily used to diagnose workload, patrol organisation and spatial distribution of checks, not to set "performance norms".
The second dimension covers the quality and proportionality of interventions. The ratio of fines to warnings, broken down by officers, areas and offence categories, is analysed to detect differences in sanction practice. Additionally, fine quality indicators are used: the percentage of fines annulled on formal grounds, the percentage of appeals and the share of fines upheld, which inform about the reliability of documentation, correctness of legal classification and proportionality of response.
The third group of indicators measures the effects of guard activities in terms of compliance with regulations and traffic safety. Key is the compliance rate, understood as the share of vehicles meeting system requirements (paid parking, no time-limit violation, no prohibition violation), determined on the basis of field checks and data from parking systems and automatic plate recognition.
The methodology also includes the financial dimension and spatial justice. The financial part analyses the relationship between fine revenues and the personnel and operational costs of enforcement, as well as the surplus of revenues over the cost of handling a single fine, while simultaneously monitoring safety and compliance indicators, so that "fiscal profitability" does not become the dominant assessment criterion. The spatial-social part examines the distribution of fines, clamps and tows in relation to the socio-demographic and infrastructural structure of the city, as well as the results of resident surveys on the perceived fairness and proportionality of actions, which allows the aspect of equitable burden distribution and trust in the city guard to be taken into account.
In the case of Polish cities, the application of the full set of indicators was limited by data availability. For the city guard ranking, only those measures that could be calculated for all analysed units on the basis of operational and reporting data collected in the project were used, in accordance with the descriptions provided for each metric.
The total score pool in the ranking is 1200 points. Each metric is normalised to a 0–100 scale and then multiplied by a weight, which determines the maximum number of points achievable.
Most metrics have a weight of 1 (max. 100 pts). There are two types of exceptions to this rule.
Efficiency (weight 2, max. 200 pts) is the only metric with a doubled weight. The number of parking fines per guard per month is in our assessment the most direct measure of operational effectiveness – which is why it weighs more heavily in the ranking than any other single indicator.
Towing is split into three separate metrics (general towing, from pedestrian crossings, wrecks), each with a weight of 1. The combined weight of towing is therefore 3 – higher than Efficiency – which reflects our conviction that removing vehicles posing a real hazard is equally important to fining. The split into categories also allows guards that tow vehicles exclusively for unpaid charges to be distinguished from those that respond to blocking of pedestrian crossings or remove wrecks.
Four metrics have a weight of 0.5 (max. 50 pts): Budget, Traffic Fines Share, Fine Cost and Salary. These are supporting indicators that partially duplicate information contained in other metrics. Fine cost is the quotient of the budget and the number of fines – both components already have their own places in the ranking. Budget is strongly correlated with staffing. These metrics enrich the picture but should not dominate the assessment.
By default, the guard with the lowest observed coefficient receives 0 points, and the guard with the highest receives the maximum. There are exceptions: if it is possible to define an objective expected value, it serves as the maximum points threshold – even if no guard achieves it.
An example is Leniency: a guard that issues fines in ≥ 90% of interventions (warnings ≤ 10%) receives 100 pts. Guards where warnings account for more than half of interventions receive 0 pts – regardless of how far they fall from the worst result in the dataset. Similarly, Unfairness works: 0 pts is awarded to any city where SPP additional fees are at least three times higher than guard fines – several cities reached this threshold. Opole exceeded this indicator more than eightfold, but does not receive additional negative points: the scale of degradation above the threshold does not differentiate the result. For Civic Cooperation, thresholds of 0–100% were used as a natural boundary: closing 100% of reports from the response-time system is the maximum possible.
In three metrics it was necessary to apply thresholds for another reason: a statistical anomaly caused by Zielona Góra. That formation is not an independent unit – it operates within the structures of the City Office, which artificially deflates its budget to about 3 PLN per resident (compared to a median of over 40 PLN in the remaining cities) and inflates the cost of issuing a fine to almost 7,000 PLN (the other 17 cities fall below 3,500 PLN). Using pure min-max would distort the scale for all other cities. Therefore for Budget, Traffic Fines Share and Fine Cost manually defined thresholds were applied that flatten this anomaly and restore the distinguishability of results in the middle of the field.
For metrics with the direction lower = better, the result is finally reversed (100 − result), so that a high number of points always means a better assessment.